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Abstract
In proxy signature schemes, original signers delegate proxy signers to signmessages on behalf of original signers.
Currently, most proxy signature schemes are based on the difﬁculty of discrete logarithms over ﬁnite ﬁeld or ellipse
curve addition group. Based on the difﬁculty of factorings of large integers, one normal proxy signature scheme
and one multi-proxy signature scheme are proposed. The security properties of strong unforgeability, veriﬁability,
strong nonrepudiation, strong identiﬁability, distinguishability and prevention of misuse of proxy signing power
can be fulﬁlled by the proposed schemes. In addition, the performance of the proposed schemes is analysed as well.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In 1996, Mambo et al. [20,21] introduced the concept of one proxy signature scheme, which allows
an original signer to delegate his/her signing power to a designated signer, called the proxy signer. The
proxy signer could stand for the original signer to generate signatures, referred to as proxy signatures.
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Mambo et al. [20,21] pointed out that proxy signature schemes should satisfy the following six prop-
erties: (1) Unforgeability: Except the original signer, only the designated proxy signer can create a valid
proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. (2) Veriﬁability: From a proxy signature, the veriﬁer or
the receiver can conﬁrm the original signer’s agreement on the signed message. (3) Undeniability: Once
a proxy signer generates a valid proxy signature on behalf of the original signer, he or she cannot deny the
proxy signature that has been created by him or her. (4) Distinguishability: Anyone can differentiate the
proxy signature from the original signer’s normal signature. (5) Proxy signer’s deviation: A proxy signer
can create a proxy signature which can be detected to be valid. (6) Identiﬁability: The original signer can
identify the identity of the corresponding proxy signer from one proxy signature.
In order to make a proxy signature scheme fairer to the original signer and the proxy signer, Lee et al.
[14,15] somewhat enhanced the properties introduced by Mambo et al. The properties stated in [14,15]
are described in the following: (1) Strong unforgeability:A proxy signer can create a valid proxy signature
on behalf of the original signer. However, the original signer and any third party cannot generate a valid
proxy signature with the name of proxy signers. (2) Strong identiﬁability: From a proxy signature anyone
can determine the identity of the corresponding proxy signer. (3) Strong undeniability: Once a proxy
signer generates a valid proxy signature on behalf of the proxy signer, the proxy signer cannot deny his
signature generation against anyone. (4) Prevention of misuse: It should be conﬁdent that the proxy key
pair cannot be used for other purposes. In the case of misuse, the responsibility of proxy signers should
be determined explicitly.
Since proxy signature schemes were introduced, many proxy signature schemes have been proposed
[1,3–32]. There are several kinds of proxy signature schemes. In a (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme,
an original signer can authorize a proxy group with n proxy members. Only the cooperation of t or more
proxy members is allowed to generate proxy signatures. Until now, lots of threshold proxy signature
schemes have been proposed [4,16,25,28,30,32]. In [10], the multi-proxy signature scheme was ﬁrst
proposed. It is a special case of threshold proxy signature schemes, which allows an original signer to
authorize a group of proxy members to generate multi-proxy signatures on behalf of the original signer.
In 2000, Yi et al. ﬁrst proposed proxy multi-signature schemes [31]. Then some proxy multi-signature
schemeswere proposed [5,26]. In the type of scheme, an original signer group can authorize a proxy signer
to sign messages on behalf of the original signer group. In [6,7], a new kind of proxy signature scheme,
multi-proxy multi-signature schemes, was ﬁrst proposed by Hwang et al. In the kind of scheme, only the
cooperation of all members in the original group can authorize a proxy group. Only the cooperation of
all members in the authorized proxy group could sign messages on behalf of the original group.
In 2003, Shao proposed a proxy signature scheme based on the factoring of large integers [24].However,
by our observation, his scheme is not based on factorings, but the RSA cryptosystem, for the difﬁculty
of the RSA cryptosystem is reduced to factorings, but equivalent to factorings.
In 2001, Cao [2] proposed an improved RSA cryptosystem which is really based on the difﬁculty of
factorings of large integers. In the paper, based on Cao’s scheme, one normal proxy signature scheme
and one multi-proxy signature scheme will be put forward by us. In addition, we will analyze and discuss
their security and performance as well.
In the rest of the paper, we will organize the content as follows. In Section 2, we will state Cao’s
improved RSA cryptosystem. In Section 3, we will propose one normal proxy signature scheme and one
multi-proxy signature scheme based on the improved RSA cryptosystem. As to the security of the both
schemes, we will discuss them in Section 4. In Section 5, we will analyze the performance of the both
schemes. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section 6.
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2. An improved RSA cryptosystem [2]
Select two large primes p, q at random, satisfying p ≡ q ≡ 3mod 4, here p, q can be taken as security
primes. Let N = pq, then (N) = (p − 1) ∗ (q − 1). Choose b satisfying Jacobi symbol ( b
N
) = −1,
and then take e ∈ Z with gcd(e, 14(N)) = 1, 1<e< 14(N), d ∈ Z, can be computed by ed ≡
1
2 (
1
4(N)+1)(mod(14(N))). Finally b, e,N are published as encrypt key/veriﬁcation key and d as secret
key/signature key. The improved RSA cryptosystem is detailed as follows.
Encrypt algorithm: Assume that plaintext x ∈ ZN, gcd(x,N) = 1. Then
E(x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
x2e modN,
( x
N
)
= 1,
(bx)2e modN,
( x
N
)
= −1.
(1)
Ciphertext is (E(x), c1, c2), where
c1 =
{0, 2|x,
1, 2x,
c2 =
⎧⎨
⎩
0,
( x
N
)
= 1,
1,
( x
N
)
= −1.
(2)
Deciphering algorithm: If c2 = 0, then x2e = E(x)(modN). Compute
E(x)d ≡ x2ed ≡ x1+ 14(N) ≡ ±x modN . (3)
The parity of x can be known from identiﬁer digit c1. Then plaintext x can be obtained. If c2 = 1, then
(bx)2e ≡ E(x)(modN). Compute
E(x)d ≡ (bx)2ed ≡ (bx)(1+ 14(N)) ≡ ±bx(modN). (4)
That is, x = ±b−1E(x)d(modN). Plaintext x can be gotten from identiﬁer digit c1.
As to the correctness of the deciphering algorithm, there is the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that there exists a polynomial time algorithm for ﬁnding the plaintext from
any ciphertext of the improved RSA cryptosystem. Then there exists a polynomial time algorithm for
factoring N.
The proof of Theorem 1 is omitted here. Interested readers can refer to [2].
In the following section, based on the improved RSA cryptosystem, two types of proxy signature
scheme including normal proxy signature schemes and multi-proxy signature schemes are proposed.
Because the security of the improved RSA cryptosystem is based on the factoring of large integers, our
schemes are also based on factorings of large integers. The schemes are stated in the following.
3. The proxy signature schemes based on the improved RSA cryptosystem
In the proposed schemes, there are four participants: the original signer, the proxy signers, the veriﬁer
and Certiﬁcate Authority (CA).
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Throughout the paper, U0 stands for the original signer and UP 1, UP 2, . . . , UPn stand for n proxy
signers. For user Ui his public RSA modulus is Ni =pi ∗ qi , where pi and qi are two secret large primes
and pi ≡ qi ≡ 3(mod 4). Let U ′i s private key be 1<di < 14(Ni) and its corresponding public key be
1<ei < 14(Ni), such that eidi ≡ 12 (14(Ni) + 1)(mod(14(Ni))), where (Ni) = (pi − 1) ∗ (qi − 1),
and it is certiﬁed by CA. m is the message to be signed or encrypted. b satisﬁes Jacobi symbol ( b
Ni
)=−1.
m is a warrant which is generated by the original signer and contains the identities of the original signer
and only one proxy signer or n proxy signers, the validity period of the proxy key, etc.
3.1. A normal proxy signature scheme
In the normal proxy signature scheme, only one original signer delegates one proxy signer, say, UPi ,
to sign on behalf of the original signer.
3.1.1. Proxy generation phase
Step 1: The original signer U0 computes
vi =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
h(m, IDP i)2d0 modN0,
(
h(m, IDP i)
N0
)
= 1,
(bh(m, IDP i))2d0 modN0,
(
h(m, IDP i)
N0
)
= −1.
(5)
Step 2: U0 also computes
ui = vi/NPi, (6)
wi =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
v
2eP i
i modNPi,
(
vi
NP i
)
= 1,
(bvi)
2eP i modNPi,
(
vi
NP i
)
= −1,
(7)
c′i1 =
{0, 2|vi,
1, 2vi,
c′i2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0,
(
vi
NP i
)
= 1,
1,
(
vi
NP i
)
= −1.
(8)
Step 3: The original signer U0 sends (m, ui, wi, c′i1, c′i2) to the proxy signer UPi .
Step 4: The proxy signer UPi ﬁrst gets v′i from (wi, c′i1, c′i2), that is
If c′i2 = 0, then wdPii ≡ ±v′i(modNPi). The parity of v′i can be known from identiﬁer digit c′i1.
If c′i2 = 1, then wdPii ≡ ±bv′i(modNPi). The parity of v′i can be known from identiﬁer digit c′i1.
Then UPi computes vi = ui ∗ NPi + v′i .
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Step 5: The proxy signer UPi will conﬁrm the validity of vi , that is, UPi ﬁrst computes
ci1 =
{0, 2|h(m, IDP i),
1, 2h(m, IDP i),
ci2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0,
(
h(m, IDP i)
NN0
)
= 1,
1,
(
h(m, IDP i)
NN0
)
= −1.
(9)
If ci2 = 0, then ve0i ≡ ±x(modN0). The parity of x can be known from identiﬁer digit ci1.
If ci2 = 1, then ve0i ≡ ±bx(modN0). The parity of x can be known from identiﬁer digit ci1.
Then the proxy signer UPi checks whether the following congruence holds:
x = h(m, IDP i). (10)
If it holds, the proxy signer will regard vi as his proxy signing key, or else the protocol will fail.
3.1.2. Proxy signature generation phase
Step 1: The proxy signer UPi chooses ti ∈ [1, n0] at random and computes
ri =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
t
2e0
i modN0,
(
ti
N0
)
= 1,
(bt i)
2e0 modN0,
(
ti
N0
)
= −1,
ci1 =
{0, 2|ti ,
1, 2ti ,
ci2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0,
(
ti
N0
)
= 1,
1,
(
ti
N0
)
= −1.
(11)
Step 2: UPi also computes
ki = h(m, ri, ci1, ci2), (12)
si =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
h(m, ri, ci1, ci2)
2dP i modNPi,
(
h(m, ri, ci1, ci2)
NP i
)
= 1,
(bh(m, ri, ci1, ci2))
2dP i modNPi,
(
h(m, ri, ci1, ci2)
NP i
)
= −1,
(13)
csi1 =
{0, 2|h(m, ri, ci1, ci2),
1, 2h(m, ri, ci1, ci2),
csi2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0,
(
h(m, ri, ci1, ci2)
NP i
)
= 1,
1,
(
h(m, ri, ci1, ci2)
NP i
)
= −1,
(14)
yi =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
tiv
ki
i modN0,
(
ti
N0
)
= 1,
bt iv
ki
i modN0,
(
ti
N0
)
= −1.
(15)
Step 3: UPi sends the proxy signature (m,m, yi, si, ci1, ci2, csi1, csi2) to the veriﬁer or receiver.
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3.1.3. Proxy signature veriﬁcation phase
Step 1: The veriﬁer ﬁrst checks the validity of m, if it can pass the veriﬁcation, the veriﬁer can obtain
the identities of the original signer and the proxy signer, then can acquire the public keys of the original
signer and the proxy signer from CA.
Step 2: If csi2 = 0, then seP ii ≡ ±ki(modNPi). The parity of ki can be known from identiﬁer digit csi1.
If csi2 = 1, then seP ii ≡ ±bki(modNPi). The parity of ki can be known from identiﬁer digit csi1.
Step 3: The veriﬁer computes
y
2e0
i · h(m, IDP i)−2ki = ri modN0, ci2 = 0 (16)
or
y
2e0
i · (bh(m, IDP i))−2ki = ri modN0, ci2 = 1. (17)
Step 4: The veriﬁer checks whether the following congruence holds:
ki = h(m, ri, ci1, ci2). (18)
If it also holds, the proxy signature (m,m, yi, si, ci1, ci2, csi1, csi2) is valid, or else the veriﬁer will
reject it.
3.2. A multi-proxy signature scheme
In the proposed scheme,UP 1, UP 2, . . . , UPn are n proxy signers.Here assumeNP 1NP 2 · · · NPn.
3.2.1. Proxy generation phase
The phase is the same as that of the normal proxy signature scheme.
3.2.2. Proxy signature generation phase
Step 1: The proxy signer UP 1 chooses t1 ∈ [1, n0] at random and computes
r1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
t
2e0
1 modN0,
(
t1
N0
)
= 1,
(bt1)
2e0 modN0,
(
t1
N0
)
= −1,
c11 =
{0, 2|t1,
1, 2t1,
c12 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0,
(
t1
N0
)
= 1,
1,
(
t1
N0
)
= −1
(19)
and sends (r1, c11, c12) to UP 2.
Step 2: The proxy signer UP 2 chooses t2 ∈ [1, n0] at random and computes
r2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
r1t
2e0
2 modN0,
(
t2
N0
)
= 1,
r1(bt2)
2e0 modN0,
(
t2
N0
)
= −1,
c21 =
{0, 2|t2,
1, 2t2,
c22 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0,
(
t2
N0
)
= 1,
1,
(
t2
N0
)
= −1
(20)
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and sends (r2, c11, c12, c21, c22) to UP 3.
. . .
Step n: The proxy signer UPn chooses tn ∈ [1, n0] at random and computes
r = rn =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
rn−1t2e0n modN0,
(
tn
N0
)
= 1,
rn−1(btn)2e0 modN0,
(
tn
N0
)
= −1,
cn1 =
{0, 2|tn,
1, 2tn,
cn2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0,
(
tn
N0
)
= 1,
1,
(
tn
N0
)
= −1
and broadcasts (r, c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2). Then each of proxy signers can compute k = h(m, r, c11, c12,
. . . , cn1, cn2).
Step n + 1: UP1 computes
cs11 =
(
h(m, r, c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2)
NP 1
)
, (21)
s1 =
{
h(m, r, c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2)
2dP1(modNP 1), cs11 = 1,
(bh(m, r, c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2))
2dP 1(modNP 1), cs11 = −1,
(22)
cs12 =
{0, 2|h(m, r, c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2),
1, 2h(m, r, c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2),
(23)
y1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
t1v
k
1 modN0,
(
t1
N0
)
= 1,
bt1v
k
1 modN0,
(
t1
N0
)
= −1.
(24)
UP1 sends (y1, s1, cs11, cs12) to UP2 .
Step n + 2: UP2 computes
s2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
s
2dP2
1 (modNP 2),
(
s1
NP 2
)
= 1,
(bs1)
2dP2(modNP 2),
(
s1
NP 2
)
= −1,
cs21 =
{0, 2|s1,
1, 2s1,
(25)
cs22 =
(
s1
NP 2
)
, y2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
y1t2v
k
2 modN0,
(
t2
N0
)
= 1,
y1bt2v
k
2 modN0,
(
t2
N0
)
= −1.
(26)
UP2 sends (y2, s2, cs11, cs12, cs21, cs22) to UP3 .
. . .
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Step n + n: UPn computes
s = sn =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
s
2dPn
n−1 (modNPn),
(
sn−1
NPn
)
= 1,
(bsn−1)2dPn(modNPn),
(
sn−1
NPn
)
= −1,
csn1 =
{0, 2|sn−1,
1, 2sn−1,
(27)
csn2 =
(
sn−1
NPn
)
, y = yn =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
yn−1tnvkn modN0,
(
tn
N0
)
= 1,
yn−1btnvkn modN0,
(
tn
N0
)
= −1.
(28)
UPn sends the proxy signature (m,m, c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2, y, s, cs11, cs12, . . . , csn1, csn2) to the
veriﬁer or receiver.
3.2.3. Proxy signature veriﬁcation phase
Step 1: The veriﬁer ﬁrst checks the validity of m, if it can pass the veriﬁcation, the veriﬁer can
obtain the public key of the original signer, the identity IDi and the public key of the proxy signer
UPi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) from CA.
Step 2: If csn2 = 1, then sePn ≡ ±sn−1(modNPn). The parity of sn−1 can be known from identiﬁer
digit csn1. If csn2 =−1, then sePn ≡ ±bsn−1(modNPn). The parity of sn−1 can be known from identiﬁer
digit csn1.
. . .
If cs22 = 1, then seP22 ≡ ±s1(modNP 2). The parity of s1 can be known from identiﬁer digit cs21.
If cs22 = −1, then seP22 ≡ ±bs1(modNP 2). The parity of s1 can be known from identiﬁer
digit cs21.
If cs12 = 1, then seP11 ≡ ±k(modNP 1). The parity of k can be known from identiﬁer digit cs11. If
cs12 = −1, then seP11 ≡ ±bk(modNP 1). The parity of k can be known from identiﬁer digit cs11.
Step 3: The veriﬁer computes
y2e0 · (h(m, IDP 1) · · · · · h(m, IDPn))2k(modN0) = r (29)
and checks whether the following congruence holds:
k = h(m, r, c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2). (30)
If it also holds, the proxy signature (m,m, c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2, y, s, cs11, cs12, . . . , csn1, csn2) is
valid, or else the veriﬁer will reject it.
Theorem 3.1. The veriﬁcation Eq. (30) holds if (m,m, c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2, y, s, cs11, cs12, . . . ,
csn1, csn2) is one valid proxy signature.
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Proof.
y2e0 modN0 =
y2e0n =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
y
2e0
n−1t
2e0
n v
2e0k
n (modN0),
(
tn
N0
)
= 1
y
2e0
n−1(btn)
2e0v2e0kn (modN0),
(
tn
N0
)
= −1
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
y
2e0
n−2(tn−1tn)
2e0v2e0kn−1 v
2e0k
n (modN0),
(
tn
N0
)
= 1,
(
tn−1
N0
)
= 1
y
2e0
n−2(btn−1tn)
2e0v2e0kn−1 v
2e0k
n (modN0),
(
tn
N0
)
= 1,
(
tn−1
N0
)
= −1
y
2e0
n−2(tn−1btn)
2e0v2e0kn−1 v
2e0k
n (modN0),
(
tn
N0
)
= −1,
(
tn−1
N0
)
= 1
y
2e0
n−2(btn−1btn)
2e0v2e0kn−1 v
2e0k
n (modN0),
(
tn
N0
)
= −1,
(
tn−1
N0
)
= −1
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
y
2e0
n−2(tn−1tn)
2e0h(m, IDn−1)2kh(m, IDn)2k(modN0), 1, 1
y
2e0
n−2(btn−1tn)
2e0h(m, IDn−1)2kh(m, IDn)2k(modN0), 1,−1
y
2e0
n−2(tn−1btn)
2e0h(m, IDn−1)2kh(m, IDn)2k(modN0), −1, 1
y
2e0
n−2(btn−1btn)
2e0h(m, IDn−1)2kh(m, IDn)2k(modN0), −1,−1
= . . .
= (bj t1 · . . . · tn)2e0(h(m, IDP 1) · . . . · h(m, IDPn))2kmodN0,
where j is the number of the element −1 in the set {c12, c22, . . . , cn2}.
r = rn =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
rn−1t2e0n modN0,
(
tn
N0
)
= 1
rn−1(btn)2e0 modN0,
(
tn
N0
)
= −1
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
rn−2t2e0n−1t
2e0
n modN0,
(
tn
N0
)
= 1,
(
tn−1
N0
)
= 1
rn−2(btn−1)2e0 t2e0n modN0,
(
tn
N0
)
= 1,
(
tn−1
N0
)
= −1
rn−2t2e0n−1(btn)
2e0 modN0,
(
tn
N0
)
= −1,
(
tn−1
N0
)
= 1
rn−2(btn−1)2e0(btn)2e0 modN0,
(
tn
N0
)
= −1,
(
tn−1
N0
)
= −1
= . . .
= (bj t1 · . . . · tn)2e0 modN0.
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Thus we can obtain y2e0 ·(h(m, IDP 1) · . . . ·h(m, IDPn))−2k modN0=(bj t1 · . . . · tn)2e0(h(m, IDP 1) ·
. . . · h(m, IDPn))2k(h(m, IDP 1) · . . . · h(m, IDPn))−2k = (bj t1 · . . . · tn)2e0 modN0 = r . Then we can
have the veriﬁcation Eq. (30).
4. Security analysis and discussion
4.1. Proxy protected
In the normal proxy signature scheme, the original signer can get (ri, yi, ci1, ci2) by selecting random
ti ∈ [1, N0], however, he/she cannot obtain si as he/she has no knowledge of the proxy signer’s private key
dP i . Similarly, in the multi-proxy signature scheme, the original signer can get (c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2, y)
by selecting t1, . . . , tn ∈ [1, N0] at random, whereas, he/she cannot get s since he/she has not any
knowledge of all proxy signers’ private keys. Thus the original signer cannot forge a valid proxy signa-
ture (m,m, c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2, y, s, cs11, cs12, . . . , csn1, csn2). Therefore, the proposed schemes can
provide the function of proxy protection.
4.2. Strong unforgeability
From Section 4.1, we know that on giving any message the original signer cannot create a valid proxy
signature. Of course, the third party cannot generate any valid proxy signature on giving any message
either. Similarly, less than n proxy signers cannot generate a valid proxy signature on given any message.
In addition, from the proxy signature (m,m, yi, ci1, ci2) or (m,m, c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2, y, s, cs11,
cs12, . . . , csn1, csn2), the original signer cannot generate another valid proxy signature on the same mes-
sage m since from the veriﬁcation equation, the original signer will be faced with the difﬁculty of solving
factorings of large integers and breaking the secure one-way hash function.
In the multi-proxy signature scheme, less than n proxy signers cannot generate a valid proxy signature
on any message since they have no knowledge of the other proxy signers’ private keys. From the multi-
proxy signature (m,m, c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2, y, s, cs11, cs12, . . . , csn1, csn2), less than n proxy signers
cannot generate another valid proxy signature on the same message m due to the same reason either.
Third, it is evident that the third party cannot produce a valid proxy signature on any message or a
known message for the third party knows less secret information of proxy signers than the original signer
or less than n proxy signers.
From the three aspects, we can conclude that the proposed schemes can provide the security property
of strong unforgeability.
4.3. Strong nonrepudiation
In the normal proxy signature scheme and the multi-proxy signature scheme, when the proxy signature
is veriﬁed, proxy signers’ identities IDP i and public keys eP i are used in the veriﬁcation congruence,
which means that the proxy signers cannot deny having signed the message on behalf of the original
signer to any person.
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4.4. Strong identiﬁability
As stated in Section 4.3, any person can verify the validity of the proxy signature (m,m, yi, ci1, ci2)
or (m,m, c11, c12, . . . , cn1, cn2, y, s, cs11, cs12, . . . , csn1, csn2) by using the proxy signers’ public keys
and identities. Thus any person can know the identities of the proxy signers. Therefore, the property of
the strong identiﬁability can be gotten in the proposed schemes.
4.5. Distinguishability
In the proposed schemes, when the proxy signature is veriﬁed, not only proxy signers but also the
original signer’s public keys and identities are used in the veriﬁcation phase, so we can regard it as a
proxy signature, not a normal signature. Thus, any one can distinguish the proxy signature from normal
signatures.
4.6. Veriﬁability
In the proposed schemes, on one hand, from the warrant m, the veriﬁer can know who are the original
signer and the proxy signers. On the other hand, when the proxy signature is veriﬁed, the original signer
and the proxy signers’public keys and identities are used in the veriﬁcation congruence. Thus the original
signer cannot deny having delegated his signing capability to the designated proxy signers. That is to
say, a veriﬁer can be convinced of the original signer’s agreement on the signed message. Therefore, the
proposed schemes can fulﬁll the security property.
5. Performance of the proposed schemes
To design proxy signature schemes really based on factorings of large integers, the improved RSA
encryption and signature schemes are used. Compared with standard RSA cryptosystems, the procedure
of the encryption and signature costs more computation overheads, and the procedure of the decryption
and the signature veriﬁcation costs almost the same computation overheads. Compared with the proxy-
protected proxy signature schemes based on standard RSA cryptosystem proposed by Shao [3], in the
proxy generation phase, the two proposed proxy signature schemes cost a little more computation and
communication overheads; in the proxy signature generation phase, our schemes also cost a little more
computation and communication overheads; in the proxy signature veriﬁcation phase, our schemes cost
nearly the same computation and communication overheads. Shao’s schemes are based on the standard
RSA cryptosystem whose difﬁculty is equivalent to the factoring, whereas, our schemes are based on the
improved RSA cryptosystem whose difﬁculty is the factoring of large integers.
6. Conclusions
We have proposed one normal proxy signature scheme and one multi-proxy signature scheme which
are really based on the difﬁculty of factorings of large integers. Both the schemes can provide the fol-
lowing security properties: (1) Proxy protected; (2) Veriﬁability; (3) Strong unforgeability; (4) Strong
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nonrepudiation; (5) Strong identiﬁability; (6)Distinguishability. Besides, we have analyzed and compared
the performance of the proposed schemes with that of Shao’s scheme.
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